A lot of people don't seem to understand what raw intelligence is. If someone calls up the CIA and says they have Prince Albert in a can, this becomes an unverified, "raw" intelligence report. It is neither proven nor unproven. It has to be analysed by intelligence experts according to how well the report fits into the known facts before it can be considered valid intelligence that we should build national policy around.
Here's how that would work. Let's actually use the "Prince Albert in a Can" example: First, it's sent to the guy who is been studying Prince Albert all his life and knows Prince Albert very well. Given what he knows about Prince Albert, he thinks the report is fairly unlikely, and he gets ahold of the guy who knows a lot about cans for a second opinion. They look at the report together and agree that it's not very likely. They look at the tipster's file and see a Fabrication Notice -- the tipster has previously given them information that was later proven false. They mark the report as Very Unlikely, and go on to the next one.
Now for what's been happening in this administration: the politically-appointed heads of defense and intelligence, who before their appointments were part of a lobbying group claiming that certain people had Prince Albert in a can, order their staffs to produce all intelligence reports, verified or not, about Prince Albert and about cans. The "Prince Albert in a Can" report is sent to the top, bypassing the fact-checking bureaucrats. Since the politicians are dying to find any evidence that Prince Albert really is in a can, they ignore the Very Unlikely warning and the bit about it coming from a known liar and send it to the White House. Bush goes on TV and announces, "We know they have Prince Albert in a can. This is the best intelligence possible, verified by our analysts and analysts from other countries." Colin Powell goes to the United Nations and shows them a picture of a can, and says "This is where they're keeping Prince Albert." A copy of the Prince Albert report is leaked to the government-friendly Weekly Standard which republishes it in the cover story "CASE CLOSED: They Have Prince Albert in a Can!", after which Dick Cheney tells the nation to look in the Weekly Standard report for "your best source of information on Prince Albert's whereabouts". All the while, the medium to low ranking intelligence officers in the US and allied intelligence agencies are leaking like mad to the press and unanimously insisting that we don't have any proof they have Prince Albert in a can and the intelligence isn't as good as Bush and Cheney claim it to be, and US and UN weapons inspectors report that they've looked inside the can that Powell pointed out and there's nothing there.
After a time of this, some of us in the public start to think the long-term bureaucrats are more trustworthy than the politically driven higher ranks.
Posted by Warrior Tang at March 20, 2004 01:59 PM
That's the most coherent explanation of the intel-vetting process I've read yet. And precisely what happened. Thanks!
Posted by: andante at March 20, 2004 03:05 PMOdd.
The last line there made me think of the changes the US made to the Japanese government after WW2. We removed all the politicians, but left the bureaucracy in place. Thing is, in Japan (unlike the US) the bureaucracy is where all the power resides.
Wonder if we're due for a change. ^_^
Posted by: Damien Roc at March 20, 2004 03:26 PMThanks for the compliment, Adante.
DRoc made me start thinking... as I recall, in Iraq, we expelled Baathists from the government. That effectively gutted the bureaucracy but also prevented it from being used by the Baathist resistance. It's a tossup in my eye whether it was a net loss or gain for pacification, but it probably slowed the transition process. It's worth further thought.
Posted by: Warrior Tang at March 20, 2004 07:46 PM